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Abstract· 
While much research has focused on the development of reliability prediction 
methodologies for the electronics industry, far less work addresses the evaluation of 
mechanical rotating equipment. Structured prediction methodologies that consider and 
attempt to reduce the resource requirements of reliability prediction do not exist in this 
realm. Various prediction techniques to ascertain the failure rates of mechanical 
equipment are widely accepted and applied, each having different resource requirements 
and each inducing different degrees of uncertainty. A methodology is reported herein to 
assist the engineer in performing reliability prediction. This iterative framework utilizes 
simulation to evaluate the uncertainty of reliability prediction, and, in each iteration, 
identifies the critical components that have the greatest impact on the uncertainty of 
predicted reliability for the entire system. Non-critical components are not included in 
the more rigorous, and costly, �ubsequent iterations. Thus, the engineer is presented with 
a tool by which the resources consumed in reliability prediction may be reduced. 
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Modem industry runs on equipment. In a perfect world, industry would never be 
handicapped by that equipment failing. Since there has yet to be the breakthrough 
development that leads to infinite lifetimes for equipment, the equipment will, at some 
point, fail. It is the job of the reliability engineer to minimize the frequency and effects 
of those failures. In order to do so, the reliability engineer must first predict the failures. 
The significance of reliability prediction may be found in the standards of the two 
biggest original users of reliability prediction, the American Department of Defense 
(DoD) and the British Ministry of Defense (MoD). From United States military 
standards and handbooks: 
Reliability predict;ion is an essential function in evaluating a design from 
concept through development and in controlling changes during 
I • 
production. Prediction provides a rational basis for design decisions such 
as the choice between alternative concepts, choice of part quality levels,· 
derating to be applied, use of proven versus state-of-the-art techniques, 
and other factors. [ 13 ,iii] 
"Reliability prediction provides the quantitative baseline needed to assess progress in 
reliability engineering. A prediction made of a proposed design may be used in several 
ways." [14, 3-1] 
The British MoD echoes that sentiment: 
_The principal purposes of a reliability prediction are: 
1 
(a) to provide an early indication of the system's potential to meet the 
reliability requirement before practical data are available on the system in 
question [ ... ] 
(b) to reveal aspects of the design which require particular attention to 
reliability or which present higher risks in relation to the achievement of 
the requirement; 
(c) to provide inputs to related project activities such as design 
reviews, design evaluation, trade-off studies, life cycle costing, logistics 
studies, safety analyses and apportionments. [2, 14-1] 
These.handbooks and standards represent some of the most well defined 
documentation of reliability procedures available. The fact that they place such a great 
importance on the prediction of the system reliability should establish the significance of 
that task. 
Since the term reliability is often used in non-engineering terms, the 
inexperienced reader might have some uncertainty as to its application in the field of 
engineering. A common definition of reliability is the probability that a component or 
system will perform its intended function for a given set of conditions over. a specified 
period of time. It is that probability that most, if not all, decisions regarding the reliability 
of a system are based upon. The problem lies in assigning a value to that probability. 
The most accurate method would obviously be to test the equipment under identical 
operating conditions and use that experience to estimate .the probability of it failing. 
While accurate, the resources needed to perform such testing for all components in a 
system would quickly become prohibitive. Conversely, ballpark estimates, while 
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inexpensive to obtain, may not provide the engineer with sufficient precision to make a 
decision regarding the system. 
The probability that equipment will fail is a function of the mean time between 
failures (MTBF) of the equipment. This value is the average time between failures of a 
repairable component. When dealing with non-repairable components, the appropriate 
term is mean time to failure (MTTF). The analysis presented herein will focus solely on 
non-repairable systems. As discussed by Kales, when discussing non-repairable systems 
where the analysis begins at time equal to 0, MTTF and MTBF may be used 
interchangeably. [10] Because of this, when citing other authors, the term MTTF is 
used, regardless of the notation in the cited source. 
There has been a tremendous amount of effort dedicated to assigning values to the 
MTTF in the electronics industry. Reliability prediction itself was born out of the 
frequent failures of the electronic tubes used in the manned space program. [6, SP-321] 
Less common is the available literature and research regarding the reliability prediction 
of mechanical rotating equipment. A combination of the complexity of causes of failure 
and the more pressing requirements of electronics in aerospace and military industries 
have left the reliability engineer in less developed territory when dealing with the types of 
equipment commonly encountered in industrial environments. 
The iterative methodology presented herein will aid the engineer not only in 
choosing from the commonly accepted component prediction techniques, but will also 
provide a manner by which to evaluate the uncertainty induced by the chosen technique. 
The procedure will also reduce the number of components requiring resource consuming 
analysis in each iteration. 
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1.1 Problem Statement 
In order to make a decision based upon probabilistic analysis, a reliability 
engineer must obtain an estimate of the reliability of the component, sub-component, or 
system. Such estimates would be applied in most prescribed methods for comparing the 
reliability of equipment, and also in certain Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM) and 
Str�amlined RCM (SRCM) programs. Determining the reliability of the system hinges 
on providing numerical values for the MTTFs for the components and sub-components. 
While there are methods to generate valu·es for MTTFs, most procedures outline 
the use of the same method for every component in the system. While this is certain to 
ensure that all of the resulting predictions are thoroughly performed, these approaches 
require that each prediction be treated as equally important to the overall system 
reliability prediction. It would therefore be useful for an iterative algorithm to exist that 
would assist the engineer in selecting prediction methods and evaluating the uncertainty 
resulting from those selections in such a manner as to reduce required resources needed 
to perform the prediction phase of any reliability project. 
1.2 Scope of Work 
Since there are a number of established predictions methods, it would not be 
beneficial to attempt to duplicate that work. Instead, the current methods will be 
analyzed, and grouped into generic classifications for use in an iterative method. The 
strengths and weaknesses of the generic groups will be identified from literature and be 
used to develop a sequence of methods that will encompass the need for highly precise 
prediction, highly expedient prediction, or a combination of the two. Highly precise 
·, 
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predictions consume more resources, while highly expedient predictions are faster and 
cheaper, but typically result in much lower certainty. 
In order to reduce the resources required for prediction, each iteration will require 
a method not only to determine the system reliability and its variance compared to a 
baseline, but also to identify the components whose predictions have the greatest impact 
on the system uncertainty. The analysis of the system reliability will be made using 
Monte Carlo simulation to choose values based upon the distributions of each 
component's prediction and inserting those values into the equation for system reliability. 
The impact of each component's prediction on the system reliability will be identified 
through sensitivity analysis. 
This approach relies on two key prerequisites. The first, that a Failure Modes 
Effects Analysis (FMEA) has been performed to identify the components needing 
analysis. The second is that the engineer has identified both a minimum value (the lower 
limit) for the system reliability and a probability that the system's reliability will not fall 
below that lower limit. 
The distributions used in this approach are those most commonly associated with 
the process industries. The primary focus of this methodology will deal with rotating 
equipment, although methods designed for electronics and static structures will not be 
excluded. This type of equipment has frequent industrial applications, and is less 
frequently discussed in literature. 
5 
1.3 Anticipated Results 
In order to minimize the number of components that require resource-consuming 
analysis, an iterative scheme will be developed whereby each component will be first 
evaluated by a simple, inexpensive method. Unless it is possibly to obtain significant 
historical data without commitment of resources, the predictions garnered .from this 
phase will most likely contain a great deal of uncertainty. The system reliability will be 
evaluated, compared to some established baseline, and the predictions of those 
components whose variance has a lesser effect on the· system reliability will be deemed 
acceptable. Those components whose variance have a greater effect on the system 
reliability wiU require more rigorous, resource consuming prediction methods. 
1.4 Organization 
Appendix A 1 will provide readers who are unfamiliar with the concepts of 
reliability engineering with a short review of the fundamentals utilized in the remainder 
of the work. The second chapter will review the history of reliability prediction, evaluate 
currently accepted methods of prediction, and more specifically discuss the details of the 
problems identified in the problem statement. The iterative methodology developed to 
choose and evaluate prediction methods will be outlined in the third chapter. A sample 
problem will be solved in chapter 4 to provide insight into the use of the different 
prediction methods recommended. The conclusions reached, as well as a discussion of 
the limitations of the methodology and the potential for future work, will be presented in 





Reliability prediction first became an area of interest as a result of post World 
War II technologies. While developing manned flight programs, the notoriously 
unreliable electronic tub�s began to draw attention. Various studies and groups were 
commissioned to investigate this problem, and as a result, the Advisory Group on 
Reliability of Electronic Equipment (AGREE) was formed in the 1950s. [6] AGREE 
was to identify actions that would result in more reliable electronic equipment. It was 
during this time that reliability engineering as a discipline was conceived. 
The 1950s would produce some significant steps in reliability engineering, as 
efforts were focused on improving the reliability of components through both design and 
testing. The first dedicated reliability programs were established, and statistical analyses 
were incorporated into reliability predictions. RCA' s TR- 1 100, "Reliability Stress 
Analysis for Electronic Equipment," published in 1956 propagated the use of 
mathematical models in reliability prediction. [ 6] The first symposiums on reliability 
prediction were held during these times. 
The 1960s would see a virtual explosion of research and publication in the area of 
reliability prediction. One of the most significant documents in reliability prediction, 
Military Handbook 217 "Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment" (MH-217), was 
first released in 1962 by the US Navy. MH-2 17 quickly eclipsed all other standards, 
partly due to its inclusiveness, and partly due to the defense contractors' forced adherence 
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to the standard. Also in 1962, the first symposium on physics of failure was held in 
Rome. The sponsoring agencies, Rome Air Development Center (RADC) and ITT 
Research Institute (IITRI) would both have major reliability prediction roles in the future. 
It was during this time period that two distinct groups of reliability engineers evolved, 
with th� physics-of-failure engineers and scientists progressing towards improving 
equipment reliability, and the systems engineers predicting, testing, and specifying 
equipment reliability. [6] 
In the 1970s, RADC took responsibility for the upkeep of:MH-2 17, and in 1974 
released the first revision (MH-2 l 7B). Many fundamentally sound models for reliability 
-prediction were developed at this time, but were rejected by the users as being to 
cumbersome. Physics-of-failure suffered the same fate, requiring information that was 
simply not available to typical users, and as a consequence were left out of:MH-217. 
Systems at this point were relatively simple, and the individual components were the 
primary focus. [ 6] 
Integrated circuit (IC) technology forever changed reliability prediction in the 
1980s. Industries began to develop their own models for more specific applications, with 
the automotive and telecommunications industries diverging from :MH-217. :MH-217 
itself was updated frequently, the last occurrence being 1991  when :MH-217F was 
released. ICs provided much more complex systems, and suddenly the individual 
components were no longer the limiting factor. The traditional approach of collecting 
field data and quantifying model factors based upon statistical analyses was no longer 
feasible. Up until this point, the standard measure of complexity had been the number of 
gates or transistors used. [ 6] 
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Since no preference had been established for either physics of failure or 
empirically based models, the debate rages on. The premises of lower system 
complexity that earlier models depended upon were no longer viable, and system­
wide factors now dominate predictions. [7] 
2.2 Current Methods 
Ministry of Defense (MoD) DEF ST AN 0041/3 identifies the preferred 
methods of reliability prediction: similar equipment method, extrapolation 
method, and generic parts method. While other prediction methods exist, their 
lack of common acceptance and use throughout industry has not yet warranted 
their inclusion here. [2] Conspicuously absent is a technique known as physic­
of-failure. While a popular and effective technique in the electronics industry, 
publications regarding the application of this technique to mechanical rotating 
equipment are nonexistent. 
2.2.1 Similar Equipment Method 
The most accurate data for prediction is based upon similar equipment 
operating under similar conditions. Often this data is available in-house, and 
therefore comes with less uncertainty due to variance in operating conditions, but 
is based upon fewer failures, and therefore less statistically certain. [2] When 
comparing equipment to determine if similarity exists, the design similarities, 
manufacturing similarities, and operational environment and load similarities are 
taken into account. When dealing with equipment whose design is based upon 
older, but still similar equipment, the small differences can be isolated and 
evaluated for effect on the.equipment's anticipated reliability. [15] 
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2.2.2 Extrapolation of Tests and Trials 
Reliability estimations can be inferred from specific testing of equipment. These 
tests should mimic as closely as possible actually design details, duty cycle, operating 
environment, failure definition, and other operating conditions. Data gleaned from this 
method should be handled with due diligence because of the inherent uncertainties 
induced when extrapolating data outside oftest conditions. [2] 
2.2.3 Generic Parts Method 
The generic parts method relies on the principle that the reliability of a component 
can be estimated through a base failu�e rate multiplied by various factors to account for 
operating conditions. This method allows for a quick and easily applied analysis of any 
system in which the equipment configurations are known, and interdependence is low. 
Since this method is the least self-explanatory, there has been a greater amount of 
publication concerning it than the other two methods. The widely accepted US l\1IL­
HDBK-2 l 7F provides such a process for electronic equipment. The initial efforts in this 
area for non-electronic equipment were spearheaded by US Rome Air Development 
Center, although sources can now be found in a wide variety of industrial and military 
publications. [2] 
The Institute of Mechanical Engineer's Guides for the Process Industries 
publjcation The Reliability of Mechanical Systems offers a clear review of the use of 
generic parts method and its subsequent data sources for non-electronic equipment. [5] 
Generic parts count reliability prediction relies upon the premise that the overall 
reliability of the system is a function of the number of components in the system and the 
reliability of those components. The failure rates for many such components can be 
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found in published databases. IMechE summarized 22 such databases, 19 of which 
provide data for rotating equipment. [5] The summaries are included in Appendix A.2. 
Obviously, the accuracy of any prediction is related to the quality of the data it is based 
upon. Since very few mechanical components are identical, there will be many cases 
· when "closest fit" data or anecdotal estimation must be used to obtain values for the 
reliability of components. Other sources of data are from the manufacturer or historical 
data from similar applications. [ 5] 
The general form of the models is 
where AXA is the predicted failure rate for equipment X in failure mode A, � is the 
overall Failure Rate for equipment types similar to X, Ki is the stress factor for stress I, 
and p(A) is the proportion of failures in modes A 
A simplified model for global reliability 
where K1 represents the stress factor for the overall environment and K2 is the K2 is the 
stress factor based on the component nominal rating stress. Tables 1 and 2 [5] show 
recommended values for K1 and K2. Where sample data is available, confidence limits 
can be set. Bloch and Geitner also provide a method of predicting the reliability of 
turbomachinery, then, more specifically centrifugal pumps. This method is an example 
of the use of publicly available data and modification of it by the application of factors. 
For turbomachinery, a series of reliability factors are used. These factors include: type 
of equipment, equipment size, number of bearings in train, start-up time, maximum 
pressures, maximum temperature, coupling, coupling support, starting frequency, piping 
11 
Table 1: Environmental stress factors (1(1} 
General Environmental Conditions 
Ideal, static conditions 



































strains, pipe supports, expansion joints, foundation rigidity, vibration, vibration 
insulation, operators, maintenance personnel, and maintenance facilities. When the 
values are assigned based upon experience and industrial knowledge, the sum result can 
be compared with that of another piece of machinery to determine the best choice. [ 1] 
For centrifugal pumps, three factors are identified: speed (in RPM), impeller 
diameter, and flow rate. The reliability index is the product of these three and may be 
used to compare different pump options. [ 1] 
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2.3 Comparison and Evaluation of Methods 
The similar equipment method cannot be used for equipment being placed in a 
new environment, or new equipment. Additionally, smaller companies are less likely to 
have this data available, and thus more likely to develop a habit of using generic parts 
count methods. However, the prolif era ti on of sources of reliability data increase the 
likelihood of finding data based upon similar equipment. DEF ST AN 00-4 1/3 and MIL­
STD-756B identify this method as preferred whenever possible. 
While trials and tests can provide an insight into equipment behavior under 
conditions similar to the operating environment, there are two key drawbacks. Any tests 
require extrapolation to the operating environment, inducing uncertainty. More 
significantly, the cost of performing these tests in a manner to reduce that uncertainty can 
be prohibitive. The financial costs are merely a portion of the resource consumed, as 
industrial equipments' typical longevity requires a testing time much longer than the time 
frame generally given for the p�ediction phase of a project. Because of this, tests and 
trials are the method of last resort, typically only applied in systems whose consequences 
�f failure, be they monetary, safety or environmental; or system which have little 
historical reference. 
The generic parts count method is an efficient bypass of expensive tests, but 
induces an unwelcome uncertainty into the prediction. Data should be found that requires 
the fewest and most certain multipliers. Such data will be encountered in situation where 
the equipment was not similar enough for the application of the similar equipment 
method. Since this method does provide information without the commitment require� in 
the testing method, it can be used in situations where variability is not such a high 
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concern. Because there is inherent variability in the use of the generic parts count 
method, some type of sensitivity analysis must be performed before accepting the system 
reliability results. 
2.4 Prediction Organization Methods 
The military sources give some help in organizing the system prediction. DEF 
ST AN 00-41/3 gives a list of the preferential order of the three groups of prediction 
techniques, but states that a typical equipment prediction will  employ data from all three. 
[2] The US military standard for reliability prediction only specifies the use of the 
similar equipment method and generic parts count method, although the use of the similar 
equipment method is preferred. [ 15] 
While the MoD document mentions the presence of uncertainties resulting from 
the prediction methods, no manner by which to analyze the uncertainty is offered. The 
DoD document procedure·completely ignores the uncertainties induced by the prediction 
techniques it identifies. Additionally, neither of the procedures laid out by the MoD or 
DoD takes into account that the prediction of some components will be more important 
than others. Because of this, all components will be treated equally, consuming resources 
that could be diverted elsewhere. 
Coit addresses some of the issues of importance in System Reliability Prediction 
Prioritization Strategy. Company-specific field data, accelerated life test results, physics 
of failure models, publicly available data and empirical models are identified as potential 
sources of component reliability predictions. Company-specific field data, while the 
most similar to actual operating conditions, often suffers because of a low number of 
failures, resulting in a high statistical uncertainty. Accelerated life testing requires 
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extrapolation from test conditions to the operational environment, inducing both 
statistical and additional uncertainty. Publicly available data has a low degree of 
statistical uncertainty because of the high number of failures the estimates are based 
upon, but a high degree of uncertainty resulting from th� lack of knowledge of 
operational and environmental conditions. Empirical methods (which predict a constant 
failure rate) and physics-of-failure models (which produce time-dependant failure rates) 
induce uncertainty due to the fundamental differences in the models. [ 4] 
System prediction as an iterative scheme is discussed, as well as prioritization of 
prediction activities. The preliminary prediction is• performed using previous data or 
other mechanisms, and as more detailed information evolves, components predictions are 
updated or replaced. When this method is employed, there will .be instances where the 
uncertainty associated with component predictions will have a negligible effect on the 
overall system reliability prediction. This is often exhibited in redundant configurations. 
In these cases, no further resources need to be expended to estimate the component 
predictions. Conversely, when the uncertainty associated with the component predictions 
has a large effect on the overall system reliability, more analysis must be performed. [ 4] 
The Reliability Prediction Prioritization Index is introduced as a function of the 
variance of the component's prediction and the corresponding effect on the system's 
prediction. This is calculated for every component in the system. Using Pareto Analysis, 
the indices are ranked to determine a group by which the largest benefit can be made by 
the smallest assignment of resources. There are four cases where the ranking is 
overridden. These are 
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1 .  Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) classifies the component 
in the highest (most severe) class. 
2. Component technology is unproven and has yet to be demonstrated in 
fielded systems. 
3 .  Component is in a redundant configuration and the effect of common 
cause failures is believed to be significant. 
4. Other system or operational specific condition dictates more detailed 
· analysis independent of the RPPI index. [ 4] 
As mentioned previously, the use of pooled data induces uncertainty into the 
prediction. When pulling ·data for a component from N sources variance may be 
calculated as follow: 
A A 
where A.; is the ith empirical estimate of the failure rate, l is the pooled estimate of the 
failure rate, and ni is the number of failures in the ith estimate of the failure rate. [ 4] 
The concept of an iterative process reduces unnecessary commitment of resources 
to perform needless reliability prediction. The idea that a simple technique can be 
employed first and only those components needing further analysis identified leads to a 
more appropriate application of resources in reliability prediction. Unfortunately, the 
calculation of the RPPI can itself be cumbersome, requiring partial derivatives of the 
system reliability as a function of each component. This method also lacks a mechanism 
to incorporate the variance if provided by an individual source. The component 
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prediction variance is calculated based upon the given failure rates, with the uncertainty 
coming from the different rates for the sources, with no acknowledgment of the variance 
each of those sources brings. 
Coit introduces a method to determine confidence intervals for complex systems 
when using estimated component reliability. The method, System Reliability Confidence 
Intervals (SRCI), is a three-step approach. First, the variances of the components are 
estimated, the system variance is calculated, and the system reliability CI is calculated 
based upon a lognormal distribution for the system reliability. [3] 
SRCI applies only to systems of active redundancy, with a lognormal distribution 
for the system reliability, and component independence. Those assumptions limit the 
applicability to a specific set of systems, and therefore cannot be used for all cases. 
A potential solution to the complexity of statistical calculation is the use of Monte 
Carlo simulation. Orman, Cassady, and Greenwood outline a method for using 
simulation to generate a model to evaluate the conceptual design of a proposed system. 
While this is not an entirely new concept, most previous approaches have been generated 
for a specific system. The approach presented, however, is a general simulation model. 
Without knowing the specific failure rates for the individual components, mission 
reliability, average time to failure and average mission cost can be estimated for the 
system. [ 13] 
The model relies on the number of components in active and/or inactive 
redundancy, the known failure rate or failure rate probability distribution, the acquisition 
cost of the component, the length of the mission (required life cycle), and the cost of 
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mission failure. Over a set of replications, the expected reliability, the MTTF, and the 
cost of operation are estimated. The confidence interval can also be established. 
Gedam and Beaudet provide a more detailed description of the use of Monte 
Carlo Simulation. In this approach, the block diagram is transformed into a table in an 
Excel� spreadsheet. After proving the randomness of the Excel random number 
generator, exponential, Wiebull, normal, uniform, and lognormal distributions were 
employed to simulate system reliability. An expression is provided to calculate the 
confidence intervals based upon the number of simulations. Further improvement can be 
made by instructing Excel to display Probability Density Functions (PDFs) and 
Cumulative Pistribution Functions (CDFs). [9] 
The use of simulation provides a method to estimate. system reliability and 
uncertainty without complex statistical calculations. However,' the methods used to 
introduce the failure rates into the simulation are not faultless. Orman uses an optimistic, 
pessimistic, and most likely technique to derive an equation for the values of TTF to be 
pulled from. It may not be possible for a set of data sources to be combined into those 
three points smoothly. Gedam and Beaudet use provided mean and variance values for 
each component. As in the case with RPPI, those values may not always be possible to 
calculate. 
Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of the organizational methods discussed. 
If some of the components of the methods were combined, a methodology could be 
developed that would avoid some of the weaknesses. By following such a methodology, 
the reliability engineer could perform the system prediction in a manner whereby the 
resources required would be less than by using any of the methods described. 
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Table 3: Swmmy of Organizational :Methods 
� Uncertainty Analysis Reduces Resources Identifies techniques 


















3.0 Prediction Methods 
Chapter III 
Methodology 
Borrowing the concept of iteration from the RPPI strategy [3 ], an iterative method 
is proposed. It will consist of three-phases, each requiring a significant increase in the 
committal of resources. The First Phase utilizes little expenditure of resources, and is 
more based upon educated estimates than numerical histories. The Second Phase uses the 
available historical data. The Third Phase requires life cycle testing under similar 
operating conditions. Figure 1 provides an overview of the methodology. 
Figure 1 .  Overview of Methodology 
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During each phase, Monte Carlo simulation will be used to generate values for the 
MTTF. These values will be used to calculate the component and system reliability. The 
results of each iteration will be compared to a set lower reliability limit and the total 
number below the limit will be tallied. By dividing by the number of iterations 
performed, the probability of the system reliability falling below the given limit can be 
calculated. If that probability is too high (hence the prediction is unacceptable), more 
detailed predictions must be applied. If the system is deemed acceptable, the analysis 
may be stopped. This diffe�s from the previously discussed techniques in that only the 
lower limit of reliability is a matter for concern. Before the next phase, the sensitivity of 
each component and sub-component will be calculated to assist in determining which 
component's predictions contribute the most to the system reliability prediction' s 
uncertainty. Those components whose variance does not affect the system significantly 
can be accepted in their current state, and the values for those predictions carried into the 
next phase. Re-prediction, a cycling technique, permits those components to be re­
analyzed if the uncertainty resulting from their prediction becomes significant in 
subsequent phases. 
There are some preliminary steps that must be taken before the evaluation may 
begin. �hese steps are outlined in Figure 2. The· first step is to perform an FMEA on the 
system, as described by either the governing documents for the i_ndustry, or any 
commonly accepted technique. A block diagram is then composed for the system, and 
from this block diagram, the equation for the reliability of the system as a .function of the 
component reliability is developed. The engineer must then establish a lower acceptable 
reliability limit, R£. Unless the lower limit is set well below the system's performance 
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capabilities, the imprecisions of reliability prediction will ·induce a probability that the 
system's reliability is actually below that lower limit. The engineer must therefore 
determine the acceptable probability for this event, 0: 
where R. represents the calculated reliability of the system. 
3.1 First Phase 
The First Phase predictions should be made with either readily available data, 
such as in-house histories or manufacturer's reports or the PERT 0-M-P technique. [1 1 ] 
Obviously, if information yielding a more precise distribution is present, the 0-M-P 
technique should not be applied for that component and a distribution based on historical 
data used in its place. The steps required in the First Phase can be seen in Figure 3.  
3.0. 1 . 1  
Set up Block Diagram 
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3.0. 1 .4 
Establish 
P { relSys<LowerLimit} 
3 .0. 1 .2 
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3 .0. l.3 
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Reliability Limit 
Figure 2. Preliminary Steps 
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Figure 3 .  First Phase 
3.1.1 O-M-P Estimation and Generation of Beta Distributions 
' 
The o�M-P technique involves estimating the most likely MTTF, M, the 
optimistic value ofMTTF (whereby 95% would be below this value), 0, and the 
pessimistic value ofMTJ'F (whereby 95% would be above this value), P. After 
estimating the times, a beta function can be calculated. The mean time to failure would 
be [ 1 1 ] :  
The variance i s  [ 1 1 ] :  
µ =
P + 4M + O  = M1TF 
6 




The alpha values are defined as 
_ (µ -PX2M - P - O) _ (0 - µ) a1 - (M v ) and a2 - (µ ) - µ,.p -P -P 
Sample calculations for these are available i n  Chapter 4 .  These values allow the beta 
distribution to be determined, and then related to back to the MTTF. This allows for easy 
transition into Monte Carlo simulation, as most software packages can generate beta 
values based upon the two alpha values._ [ 14] Since the O-M-P estimation will be very 
broad, Figure 4 shows the circumstances when O-M-P is preferred. 
New Component 
Must perform tests 
(Third Rlasc:) 
Use: Similar Equipnenl 
Historical Data 
(Second Rlasc:) 
Use: Generic Parts Method 
(Second Rlasc:) 
Yes Usc: O-M-P 
Estimation 
. (First Phase:) 
Figure 4. Decision Tree for Initial Data Source Selection 
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O-M-P estimation is only used when it is possible to develop credible estimates at a 
lower cost than would be incurred through the use of historical data as outlined in the 
Second Phase. Since there is no way to generate the O-M-P estimation without some 
previous experience with the component, a case where no historical data exists will force 
the immediate use of tests and trials. 
3.1.2 First Phase Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is used to generate values of the MTTF from the beta 
distribution. In each iteration of the simulation, the values for MTTF generated for every 
component are used to calculate the components' reliability. The values for the 
component are used to calculate the system reliability, which is then compared to the 
lower limit. The total number of instances where the system reliability falls below the 
lower limit are tallied. MATLAB was used to perform all of the simulation, and the 
· sample codes may be found in Appendix A.3 .  
3.1.1.2 First Phase Evaluation 
If the number of tallied instances from above divided by the number iterations 
results in a probability below the one established in step 3.0. 1.4, then the further analysis 
will be needed. Sensitivity analysis, which is discussed in depth in Section 3 .4, will 
allow the engineer to discover which component's prediction have the greatest effect on 
the system·uncertainty. These components will require analysis in the Second Phase, 
while those components whose predictions have relatively minor effects on the system 
reliability prediction's uncertainty will be left as is. Predictions that are not expected to 
improve with further analysis will also be taken as is. If however, the probability that the 
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system reliability is above the set lower limit is greater than the value specified in step 
3 .0. 1 .4, the system is acceptable, and no further steps are necessary. 
3.2 Second Phase 
Any component whose initial predictions affected the system reliability in such a 
manner as to cause an unacceptable probability of being below an acceptable level must 
be considered for further study. As noted in the military documents, historical data from 
similar equipment is preferred, however, since the variability will be calculated, the use 
of the Generic Parts Method is acceptable if needed. Components requiring the 
application of the Generic Parts Method will be more likely to require further analysis, as 
the v�iance will be higher. The Second Phase is borrows the recommended prediction 
techniques from DEF STAN 00-4 1/3 and MIL-HDBK-756B. 
Since data from pooled sources can c9me in a few different forms, diligent care 
must be applied in the application of this data. Recalling that many sources of pooled · 
data reflect d�fferent operating conditions, the environmental factors supplied by the 
generic parts count method or the particular source must be applied to each individual 
data source before the pooled reliability is estimated. Because of the variety of levels of 
information provided, there is no simple manner by which to combine data from different 
sources and still provide an accurate reflection of the variance of all sources. Therefore, 
the values for MTTF will be provided from all of the sources. In each iteration of the 
simulation, a source will be selected using a source identifier, and then the value of the 
MTTF will be selected from that source using Monte Carlo. Figure 5 shows graphically 
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Figure 5 .  Second Phase 
3.2.1 Generation of Lognormal Distributions 
Data sources will provide either: the failure rate, the failure rate and the variance, 
or the failure rate and the 90% confidence intervals. Since most sources give no 
indication as to the distribution of the estimates, the studies of Moss are relied upon to 
estimate the distribution. Moss notes that for a majority of process industry equipment 
(including rotating equipment), the distribution of the estimated MTTF is lognormal. 
[ 12] Since the lognormal distribution requires only a mean and a standard deviation, 
those cases where the variance and the mean are given, no further manipulation of the 
data is required to set up the simulation. For cases where numerical limits are supplied in 
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lieu of the variance, the worst case variance may be calculated using Chebychev' s 
inequality, 
1 
P{lx - µI � ka} � -
2 k 
where -;.. is the confidence interval. For the common 90% confidence interval, k is 
k 
1 .05409. Information from sources whose only information is number of failures and -
mean will be treated as described in RPPI. Recalling that a weighted average is used to 
calculate the mean, the equation for the variance is [3]: 
The data for this component may now be fit . as a lognormal distribution for the 
simulation. The provided distribution will be used for the simulation. 
3.2.2 Second Phase Simulation 
As stated, the random s�lection of the source will be based upon a weighted 
method. The weight of each source on the can be determined as n.j t n; : where n1 
represents the number of failures comprising source i, -and N represents the number of 
sources used. The weights are then set up on a cumulative scale such that the probability 
of selecting a source will be a function of the range of its weight. When a random 
number is generated form a uniform [0, 1] distribution, the number will fall within a 
range, and the source for that iteration will be identified . A sample of this is shown in 
Section 4.2. 1. Because the simulation in the Second Phase is more complex, a graphical 
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representation is given in Figure 6. As shown, the simulation must generate two 
variables for each component. The first, the source identifier, will be a uniform 
distribution between O and 1 .  This will be compared to the sequence of the source 
weights and a source will be chosen. The second variable will be generated from a 
distribution matching the distribution of that source, and used to generate the MTTF. 
Once the component MTTF has been determined, the simulation proceeds as it did in the 
First Phase. Note that the predictions that were left as is in Phase 1 are handled 
identically as the Phase 1 simulation (step 3. 1 .2). 
For Each 
Generate MITF Value Component 















3.2.2.1 Second Phase Evaluation 
The evaluation is similar to the one performed in step 3 . 1 .2. The probability that 
the system reliability is below the set value is compared to the probability from step 
3 .0. 1 .4. In the event that a prediction left as is in Phase 1 is now the highest source of 
variance, that component becomes a candidate for re-prediction, and historical data will 
be used to generate a MTTF distribution. If the prediction from Phase One has a 
possibility to improve, the prediction is now performed using Second Phase techniques, 
and the Phase Two simulation is performed again with the new data. When considering a 
component for Phase Three, the expectation of a prediction improving is more crucial. If 
the hi�torical data was taken fro� a number of reputable sources and based upon 
conditions similar to the operating conditions the current system is under, there is a lower 
probability that the prediction will improve through tests and trials. If this is the case, 
regardless of the variance induced into the system reliability prediction by that 
component's prediction, that prediction should be taken as is. Replication of tests already 
performed is costly, and if it does not improve the prediction, it is not a worthwhile cost 
to incur. If the historical data is based upon dissimilar operating conditions or based 
upon a small number of failures, there is a much better chance for improvement in the 
Third Phase. 
3.3 Third Phase 
The Third Phase utilizes testing under similar to operating conditions. As shown 
in Figure 7, the procedure is otherwise similar to the other two phases. The data resulting 
from similar condition testing must be fit to a function for use in simulation. 
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Figure 7. Third Phase 
3 .3.2. 1 
Third Phase 
Evaluation 
While it may be tempting to use a weighted approach as in the Second Phase, 
doing so assumes that the upper and lower limits represent the extreme limits of the mean 
• 
! 
time to failure, a highly unlikely scenario in any limited test. Steps 3.3.2 and 3.3.2. 1 are 
similar to the corresponding steps in Phases I and 2. Step 3 .3 .3 is the significant 
differe�ce. 
3.3.3 Acceptance or Rejection of System 
If the system does not meet the requirements laid out in steps 3.0. 1 .3 and 3 .0. 1 .4, 
the system will be rejected in its ·current configuration. The system' s reliability 
performance may be improved by either adding components in redundancy, or by 
replacing certain components with more reliable ones. The sensitivity and variance 
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analysis will have identified the "bad actors," those components who have the most 
detrimental effect on the system reliability. 
3.4 Sensitivity Calculations 
From Coit, the sensitivity of a subcomponent is the partial derivative of the 
system with respect to the subcomponent. (COIT) For a single component (Rx) :  
For a sub-component in a k-out-of-n parallel configuration (Rxy), the component 
sensitivity must first be calculated, and then the effect of each sub-component will be 
calculated. Care must be taken when identical components are installed in parallel. Any 
variation will be multiplied due to the reoccurrence of that component or sub-component 
in the system. 
In order to calculate the actual values for the sensitivity, the means and variances 
must be established. The 0-M-P method allows for easy calculation of these. The 
Second and Third Phase Methods req�ire a more complex calculation. Since the sources 
are often based upon varying numbers of failure, the mean can be calculated using the 
weighted average as follows: 
The variance will be estimated by simulation. The variance of each component's 
estimation will be calculated as follows : 
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2 J=I u = ------
J - 1 
where j is the current iteration, J is the number of iterations, and MTTF'j is the MTTF for 
the current iteration. Sample calculati�ns for these procedures are provided in Chapter 4. 
By multiplying each component's sensitivity and variance, the effect of variance 
on the overall system reliability can be identified. Those components whose variance has 
little effect on the system reliability would be good candidates to ignore in the next phase. 
· Also of interest would be the maximum and minimum values of system reliability 
that a fluctuation in any sub-component could produce. By substituting I (maximum 
reliability) and O (minimum reliability) for the sub-component reliability and 
· recalculating the system reliability for each subcomponent, the maximum and minimum 
system reliability can be calculated. Those components or subcomponents whose 
reliability could drop all the way to zero or increase to one and not have a significant 
effect on the system reliability would qe good candidates to ignore for future prediction 
techniques. This may be ignored for systems whose components may be modeled in 





A hypothetical sample system for consideration is presented in Figure 8 .  The system 
consists of 7 components. Component 1 is a single component. Component 2 is a system 
of 4 identical sub-components in standby redundant configuration, 2 of which must 
function for the component to function. Component 3 is a system of2 non-identical sub­
components in active redundancy, one of which is required to function for the component 




























operation. The probability of the system reliability being above this value must be 9 1 . 5% 
or above. 
The reliability of component 2 is given from Kales where, for a 2-out-of-4 
system, the system MTTF is equal to thirteen twelfths of the failure rate of the identical 
components. (R2=13R21/12=13R22'12=13/R23'12) [ 10]. Using the same reference for 
component 3, the MTTF is: 
where 11.x represents the failure rate of component x. The reliability of component three is 
-t 
thenR3 = eJ.IT!I'' .  Components 1 ,  2 and 3 are in series, and the reliability of the system 
can then be defined as 
The information regarding this hypothetical system was generated to both 
realistically simulate data that would have resulted from inquires into the sources 
mentioned, and to demonstrate the methodology for handling the different types of data 
expected to be encountered the prediction of a mechanical system. Since there are so few 
components in the system, there is a low chance of obtaining the range of data types 
necessary to demonstrate the handling of all of the common ones. 
4.1 First Phase Analysis 
The First Phase estimates shown in Table 4 are developed using the O-M-P 
method. The estimates for component 3 1  are based upon a long history at the facility, 
and are taken as very accurate. Components 1 ,2, and 3 2 are new to this operating 
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Table 4:Data Generated for The First Pass 
Optimistic Most Likely Pessimistic Mean 













enviro�ent, but 3 1  and 32 have been in operation in other somewhat similar conditions 
before. 
The mean for component one is calculated as: 
A = 
O + 4M + P 
= 




6 6 6 
Using the failure rates as the inverse of the MTTFs for components 3 1  and 32, the failure 
rates are: 
1 1 







= MITF = 26666.61 
f 
32 




The system reliability using the means is 
-1000 -1000 -1000 -
R .... = e 24661 * e 20661 * e 36l79 .2 = 0.8901 
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4.1.1 Simulation 
The system reliability was calculated using 100,000 iterations of Monte Carlo 
simulation. The system reliability for each iteration was compared against the 
established lower limit, and the percentage of those values falling below th� lo�er limit 
was noted. In order to perform the simulation, the alpha variables for the beta function 
must be calculated, as demonstrated by these calculations for component 1 :  
a = (µ. - PX,lM - P - 0) = (24667 - 18000X2 * 24000 - 18000 - 34000) = 2 5 
1 (M - µ. XO -P) (24000 - 24667X34000 - 1 8000) . 
The variance · is 
a = (O - µi )  a = (34000 - 24667) • 1 333 = 3 5 2 
(ul - P) 






34000 - 1 8000)
2 
= 25 000 000 
3 .2 3 .2 ' ' 
The simulation was performed in MATLAB using the code found in Appendix A3. 
After 100,000 iterations, there was a 3?.5 1% chance that the system reliability would be 
below the established lower limit of .9 15 .  
4.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
As shown in Chapter 3, the partial derivative of each component is 1 .  This 
signifies that whatever percent change occurs in any component, the system reliability 
will change identically. The partial derivative for subcomponents 3 1  and 32 are not so 
simply calculated. Therefore, the indirect analysis method was used. The value of the 
first component's mean MTTF was changed by 25%, and the reliability recalculated. 
The percentage change was multiplied by the prediction's variance to give the weighted 
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variance. The value for the mean MTTF was reset, and the same procedure was repeated 
for all four predictions. The prediction causing the most variance in .the system was 
component 2 (weighted variance =547000), followed by component 1 (203530). 
Components 31 (84990) and 32 (101900) contributed less to the system variance. These 
values give an indication as to the respective contribution of their prediction's variance 
into the uncertainty of the system reliability prediction. Using these, the predictions for 
components 31 and 3 2 will be left as is. 
4.2 Second Phase Analysis · 
· · · Data for components 1 and 2 were generated to represent possible values from the 
source mentioned in Chapter 2, and are shown in Table 5. Recalling that the MTTF is the 
inverse of the failure rate, the failure rates can be converted into MITFs easily. In order 
to preserve uniformity of the analysis, the failure rates have already been converted into 
MTTFs. The data for component 2 is typical of what would be found in IEEE 500 and 
CCPS. Data for component 1 is typical of results from ENI and RADC. Variance in the 
form A% +/- YYY.Y indicates that with A% confidence, the MTTF will be within the 
given mean plus or minus the YYY.Y. Recalling that the MTTF is the inverse of the 
Table 5 :  Historical Data Values for Second Pass Method 
Components 
1 2 
Source MTTF(hrs) Failures Variance , MTTF (hrs) Failure Variance 
1 26178 1 5  90% +I- 1029 35000 35 NIA 
2 27000 25 95% +I- 2565 26500 50 NIA 
31000 1 50 1200 29560 17  NIA 
32000 198 1 500 29800 18  N/A 
5 31500 150 NIA 
26000 60 NIA 
7 26700 40 NIA 
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failure rate, the failure rates can be converted into MTTFs easily. Variances given as 
confidence intervals will be transformed into worst-case variances using Chebychev' s 
equation. Source 1 for component 1 would be calculated as follows: 
Ptx - µl ·� ka}= 0.9 s -;- ⇒ k s l .05 
k 
1029 l .05a = l029 ⇒ a = -- = 980 
1 .05 
The mean for component 1 would be calculated as 
. L n; *MITE'; 1 5  * 26 178 + 25 * 27000 + 1 50 * 3 1000 + 298 * 22000 
µ - -'=-•---- = ------------------1 N 
L ni 
i=I 
= 15253670 = 3 1257.05 
488 
4.2.1 Simulation 
1 5  + 25 + 150 + 298 
From table 5, source 1 for component 1 is responsible for 15 of the 488 failures, 
or 0.0307. For all instances where the ,source identifier for component 1 is below .�307, 
the MTTF used will be 26 178 ± 980*X, wher� X i� a lognormally distributed random 
variable with a mean of0 ·and a variance of 1 .  The second source would be chosen when 
the source identifier falls between 0.0307 and � +  0.0307 = 0.08 19 . When source 1 
488 
for component 1 is selected, the value for the MTTF will be taken as 
M1TF = 26 178 + (ex - e0.s )* 980 
for x uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1 ], and e0·5 represents the mean of the 
lognormal distribution given by x. [8] 
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Each iteration chooses a source identifier and a subsequent MTTF for each 
component. This MTTF is used to generate a value for component reliability. The 
MTTF is also compared to the mean to establish a variance for each component's MTTF. 
The component's reliabilities are used to calculate the system reliability. The system 
reliability is then compared to the lower limit. At the end of the simulation, the total 
number of incidents where the system reliability was below 0.915 is tabulated and 
divided by the total number of iterations. The same is done for the variances. Since the 
predictions for components 31 and 32 were left as is from the First Phase, the values for 
the MTTF for components 31 and 32 were again taken from the Beta distribution. 
After 100,000 iterations, the probability that the system reliability was below the 
lower limit was 23. 79%. This value is below the minimum set for the prediction; 
therefore, the Third Phase method must be employed for at least one of the components. 
The calculation of the system reliability using the means of the MTTFs yields a reliability 
of .9109. 
4.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
Performing the sensitivity analysis as done in step 4. 1.2, the predictions for 
components 32 (101900) and 1 (90650) have the most effect on the system reliability 
prediction uncertainty, while components 31 (84990) and 2 (85260) have the least. Since 
the prediction from component 32 was pulled in from step 4.1, some improvement might 
be expected using Second Phase analysis, so it will be re-predicted. The historical data 
for the component 32 is found in Table 6. Repeating the same procedure as earlier, but 
substituting in the new values for component 32 yields 0=0.9135, which is below the set 
limit. The majority of the variance comes from component 1 (92362), while components 
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C 32 omponent 
MTTF(hrs) Failures Variance 
29500 100 3400 
20500 50 9000 
2 (863 1 80) and 3 1  (84988) are also significant. Component 32 (25607) contributes the 
least variance. Since the data for component 2 was compiled from 7 sources, there is a 
lower chance that the tests required in the Third Phase would provide much 
improvement. Therefore, only component 1 will be analyzed in the Third Phase. 
4.3 Third Phase Analysis 
10  components of type 1 were tested for 4 failures each, with the resulting data in 
Table 7. The mean and variance are calculated as 3227 1 . 58  and 2564.662, respectively. 
The data produces a curve in the shape a lognormal distribution. 
4.3.1 Simulation 
The simulation methods for the components not re-analyzed in the Third Phase 
remain the same. For component 1, the test data resulted in a lognormally distributed 
curve with a mean and a variance. This distribution was used to generate data points for 
T bl 7 R a e esu ts o fT . ti C estmg or omponent 1 
Pump 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
No. 
TTF 30500 298 10  3 1227 3 1 526 30003 34462 34453 3097 1 3 1607 3 13 13 
(hrs) 
TTF 3077 1 32626 30359 42838 30835 3 1207 33 885 3 1 1 1 8 30890 30 179 
fl-, .. ,,\ 
tTF 3 1 540 2992 1 3259 1 37133  37 133 33064 34783 2983 1 2988 1 32 1 82 
(hrs) 
TTF 30532 325 17  329 17  34977 32454 3446 1 29977 3099i 32583 30809 
(hrs) 
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component 1 .  The data from the Second Phase was used for components 2 and 32, and 
the original O-M-P estimate was used for component 3 1 . 
After 100,000 iterations, the probability that the system reliability is above the set 
lower limit is 9 1 .  78%. The reliability based upon the mean values of the MTTFs was 
.91 18 . 
4.4 Results 
The system reliability was found to be above .9 1 5  with more than 9 1 .5% 
confidence. Component 1 required O-M-P estimation, the use of historical data, and 
testing. Components 2 and 32 required O-M-P estimation and the use of historical data. 
The O-M-P estimate for component 32 was left as is throughout the entire analysis. Four 
types of components were predicted using 6 different prediction trials. The only 
resource-consuming test performed was justified by the uncertainty resulting in the use of 
the data sources. 
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Chapter V 
Condusions and Recommendations 
5.0 Comparison to Other Methods 
Referring to the sample analysis, the methodology presented herein will now be 
compared to the methods described in Chapter 2. Table 8 summarizes the points made in 
the comparison. 
5.0.1 Comparison to Military Standards 
DEF ST AN 00-4 1/3 would have recommended that similar equipment methods 
were used whenever possible. For any components not subject to the similar equipment 
method, tests and trials would have been used. Only if this was impossible would the 
generic parts count method be used. If the estimation from the generic parts count 
method were in fact precise enough to meet the system reliability goals, then resources 
required for tests and trials would have been expended unnecessarily. Since DEF STAN 
00-4 1/3 does not provide a method _to evaluate the uncertainty of the prediction, this 
would not have been known. 
l\fIL-HDBK-756B would have required the use of certain data sources, or 
if those data· sources were not sufficient, the use of the generic parts count method. For 
Table 8: Sunmuy of All Organizational Methods 





Uncertainty Analysis Reduc.es Resources Identifies Techniques 
N N Y 
N N Y 
N y 
y N N 
y N N 
y y y 
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reliability without any indication as to the uncertainty associated with that prediction. 
both methods, the resulting predictions would have given a value for the system 
5.0.2 Comparison to RPPI and SRCI 
RPPI would help divide the components into two groups, the first of which would 
be subject to the majority of the analysis. The calculation of the RPPI is only based upon 
the number of failures and the MTTFs of the data sources, and do not take into account 
the variances in each of the sources. The RPPI would not recommend prediction 
methods to use� although it would be obvious that the more resource consuming 
prediction methods would be used for the components in group one. Additionally, there 
are the four e?'ceptions described in chapter -2 that bypass the values of the RPPI to be 
placed automatically in group one. If the engineer were not averse to the computational 
complexity of the RPPI, the resulting information would be merely a separation of the 
components into two groups for analysis. 
The use of SRCI would be impossible for this model because of the presence of 
standby, rather than active redundancy. If, in fact, the system analyzed were in an active 
redundancy configuration, then the resulting confidence limits could have been obtained 
through statistical analysis. Although this approach .is a useful evaluation tool in certain 
cases, the simple system given in Chapter 4 could not have been analyzed using this 
method. 
Both of these methods require more strenuous calculation on the part of the user, 
and neither takes into account the quality of the data used. The methodology developed 
here requires less strenuous calculation, takes into account the quality of the data used, 
and provides an iterative method which identifies methods to procure the data. 
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5.0.3 Comparison to Simulation Methods 
Both simulation methods required that the component reliability be given by a 
single time to failure function. The model from Orman et al. uses the minimum, 
maximum, and most likely approach with a triangul� distribution. [12] Given that for 
mechanical components, the anticipated time to failure function is given by a Weibull 
distribution, the probability of error is high. The resulting anticipated system reliability 
and confidence intervals convey the same information as provided by the methodology 
developed here. The model proposed by Gedam allows for the use of multiple 
distributions (including the exponential, Weibull, and lognormal), and provides the 
syste� reliability and confidence intervals as well. [9] 
Both of these models were designed as evaluation tools. They provide no 
information regarding the source of the data entered, and no recommendation for dealing 
with unsatisfactory results. As discussed earlier, the derivation of time to failure 
distribution from the MTTF and it's confidence intervals is difficult, if not impossible for 
multiple sources of information. 
5.1 Conclusions 
A methodology has been presented by which an engineer can more efficiently 
estimate the reliability of the system by identifying the components whose predictions 
require the largest expenditure of resources. As seen in the analysis, the statistical 
manipulation required to use this methodology is minimal. A knowledge of Monte Carlo 
simulation is required, but the simulation itself is relatively simple. The greatest 
computational challenge facing the user is the curve fitting in the Third Phase. Most 
statistical analysis software, some simulation packages and many spreadsheets perform 
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this task quickly and often guide their users to identify the correct curve to fit based upon 
the given data. 
5.2 Limitations 
The methodology developed will only apply to those components where some 
degree of historical data is available. For a completely revolutionary component, or in a 
situation where there is no access to data, the methodology has no basis to begin. 
Ad_ditionally, when the distribution of the data is unknown, the only alternative given is 
the approximation of a beta distribution using the O-M-P method. There is no manner by 
which to account for modes of failure, and for repairable systems, there is no 
consideration given to the significance of availability. 
The simulation used in the methodology is only effective if the system reliability 
can be modeled as a function of the components' MTTF. In an interdependent system, 
where failures cause changes in the reliability characteristics of other components, this is 
not always the case. 
5.3 Recommendations for Further Development 
As mentioned, the methodology was developed without regard to multiple modes 
of failure for components. The incorporation of modes of failure would have many 
benefits. Recalling when certain sub-components failed may be easier than estimating 
the failure rate for the entire component. Additionally, maintenance plans typically are 
geared to affect one or two modes of failure, rather than every mode of failure for the 
component. Estimating the effects would be more difficult without the ability to break up 
the different modes of failure. Since some of the sources cited provide data for the 
percentage of failures represented by each mode, those estimates can be included in the 
48 
simulation. The estimates for the modes of failur.e can be developed using the iterative 
methodology presented in Chapter 3 .  
The estimates of mean time to repair (MTTR) are based upon the particular mode 
of failure as well. While the only prediction made was MTTF, for repairable systems, the 
availability is a more significant measure. Availability is  a function ofMTTF and 
MTTR. MTTR requires another estimation, one fraught with all of the difficulties of 
MTTF prediction, but also one more dependant on the mode of failure. MTTR 
estimations are given in some of the cited sources of pooled data, and can be developed 
using the iterative methodology presented in Chapter 3 .  
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Moss and Strutt provide an adequate introduction to the basic concepts of reliability. 
Using l to represent the equipment failure rate, the reliability, or probability that the 
equipment will perform its intended function, over time period t is 
R(t) = �-Al 
From this, the probability of failure F in time t is defined as 
F(t) = 1 - R(t) = 1 - e-.u 
Bloch and Gietner relate the manner in .which these equations can be applied to 
systems of equipment. Failure rate, l, is introduced as the expected number of failures 
per time period. The mean time between failures, MTBF, is then the reciprocal of the 
failure rate. The reliability, R(t), as a fu11:ction of time then becomes: 
-t 
R(t) = e-u = eMIBF 
When multiple parts exist in a system, they can be in two configurations, parallel or 
senes. For n parts in series, the reliability of the system, R., is defined an 
For parts in parallel, several scenarios exist. A failure of one component may cause a 
failure in the system. A failure in all components may be required to cause failure of a 
system. Bloch and Geitner only deal with these two cases. A third case is possible. A 
failure of a portion of the components may cause a failure in the system. This last case is 
described as a k-out-of-n system. The first two cases can be viewed as special cases of 
the k-out-of-n system. Applying the binary distribution, the reliability of a k-out-of-n 
system can be represented as: 
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R. = t (n '"'(1 - R)""' 
z=k xJ" 
For the case when a single part failing causes the system to fail, this translates to: 
R = R x R  x • • • x R  , 1 2 1t 
For the case when every part must fail before the system fails [I]: 
R. = 1 - [(1 - R. XI - R2 )· · · (l - R,. )] 
The afore-mentioned model for a k-out-of-n system applies only to non­
interdependent components with active redundancy. Active redundancy exists when each 
parallel component in the system is actively running at ·a11 times. Non-interdependent 
systems only .exist where the failure of one component does not affect the reliability of 
. the other components. This scenario is not as frequently seen in the realm of rotating 
equipment. The more common scenario is standby redundancy, where a component 
remains idle until it is needed to cover a failure of another component in the system. The 
most efficient mathematical models for this type of configuration are developed as 
Markov chains, and �ave been catalogued for a number of possible configurations. [ 10] 
Appendix A.2 provides a short discussion of the use of the Markov chain method in 
reliability prediction and some sample values for commonly encountered configurations. 
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Appendix A.2 
Summaries of Data Sources 
Provided by the Institute of Mechanical Engineers [5] 
6 1  
Data Source: 1 CCPS 
Full Name: Guidelines for Process Equipment Reliability with data tables 
prepared by the Equipment Reliability Subcommittee of the 
Centre for Chemical Process Safety and Science Applications 
International Corporation 
Published by: American Institute of Chemical Engineers 
Type of Source: Book : 
Date of publication: 1990 
Type of components: A wide range of chemical process equipment 
No. of component 'types: 76 process equipment type I 
Type of information: Failure rates based on both calendar and operating time. 
Failures of demand are also included where appropriate. 
Source of data: Data sources include plant specific data and general data. 
Plant specific data reflects plant process, environment, and 
maintenance practices. Generic data was collated from a 
variety of sources. All major published sources of available 
generic equipment reliability and failure rate data were used, 
including reliability studies, published research works, 
,. 
reliability data banks, government reports containing 
information gathered from chemical process, nuclear, off-
shore oil, and fossil fuel industries around the world. 
Type of data: The data are characterized as equipment failures per I 06 
operating hours for time-related failure rates and failures per 
I 03 demands for demand related failure rates. Rates are given 
for common chemical process equipment. Equipment used 
for transport of chemicals are not covered. The cause of 
equipment failures, the means to improve reliability and the 
'most' reliable equipment are not addressed. 
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Data Source: 3 DEF STAN 00-41 pt 3 
Full Name: MoD Practices and Procedures for Reliability and 
Maintainability, Part 3: Reliability Prediction, Report No. 00-
4 1  (Part 3)/Issue 1 (Issue 2 does not contain this data.) 
Published by: Ministry of Defence I 
Type of Source: Standard 
Date of publication: December 1983 
Type of components: Equipment covered in Table 5 (mechanical components) 
include a variety of static and rotating devices, instruments 
and connectors. A range of valve types are covered. 
Equipment covered in Table 6 is limited to accelerometers, 
actuators, aerials, circuit breakers, counters, gyroscopes, 
timers, transducers, solenoids and a few miscellaneous items. 
No. of component types: 95 mechanical components and 28 electro-mechanical 
components 
Type of information: Table 5 of this reference contains mechanical components 
failure rates and Table 6 provides electro-mechanical failure 
rates. Table 8 contains reliabilities of one-shot items, which 
may be of some interest to the mechanical engineer. 
Source of data: Reference sources for individual failure rates are not 
provided. 
Type of data: For each component, a basic failure rate per million hours in 
not provided, this being considered representative of a 
'ground fixed' operating regime. Environmental factors are 
then listed for 'ground mobile', ' ship protected', ' ship 
exposed', 'air protected' ,  and 'air exposed' operating regimes. 
The user is intended to select the factor most closely reflecting 
his component environment and multiply it by the base failure 
rate. It is important to note that not all environmental factors 





Type of Source: 
Date of publication: 
Type of components: 
Type of information: 
Source of data: 
Type of data: 
5 Dexter and Perkins DP-1633 
Component Failure Rate Data with Potential Applicability to 
a Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant. Report No. DP- 1633 by 
AH. Dexter and W.C. Perkins 
El Du Pont de Nemours and Company 
Report 
July 1982 
A wide variety of static, rotating and reciprocating devices, 
b9th electrical and mechanical in nature and having passive, 
process or safety function. Instrumentation used in nuclear 
installations receives good coverage. 
This document contains an extensive collection of component 
failure rate data compiled from published literature and a 
number of computer databases. There are 136 subject 
categories containing over 1200 individual data points, with 
special emphasis on components having application in the 
nuclear fuel reprocessing industry. 
Literature source of the data comprised reliability and safety 
analysis journals published during the period 1970- 1980, plus 
a number of non-journal source. Computer databases 
searched were the ORNL Energy Data Base and Nuclear 
Science Abstracts Data Base, and the DIA-LOG Compendex, 
Inspec, Ismec and Scisearch databases. 
Data is presented as an alphabetical list giving failure rates per 
hour with upper and lower bound points where these are 
available. A referen�e number is provided for each 
component failure rate enabling the user to identify the source 
via a standard list of references at the end of the document. A 
few data points are presented in terms of failure rate per 
demand or per cycle. In a very few cases an indication of the 
operating environment of the components can be deduced, for 
example, 'heavy duty', or 'light duty' .  
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Data Source: 6 EIREDA 
Full Name: European Industry Reliability Data Handbook Vol. 1 - Electrical 
Power Plants 
Published by: EUROPSTS, 38 rue Sedaine, 750 1 1  
Paris, France 
Type of Source: Data collected at 50 French nuclear power plants between 1978 and 
1988 
Date of publication: October 199 1  
Type of components: Mechanical components (pumps, valves, tanks, heat exchangers, 
filters, compressors, auxiliary turbines, etc), electrical components 
(batteries, circuit breakers, transformers, motors and generators, 
power distribution etc) and instrumentation and control equipment. 
No. of component types: 92 
Type of information: A double page spread is devoted to each component type. The first 
page details engineering characteristics (type, r/min, power, 
pressure, temperature, medium environment etc) and operational 
characteristics (operating mode, running hours and/or demands per 
year, maintenance policy and test frequency). It also has ·a coloured 
photograph of the component. The second page contains a table of 
failure rates (with error factors) for one or more failure modes 
(critical failure modes only) and mean repair times. Background 
information in each Table includes the number of 
components/plants and number of plant/years, and a separate table 
lists comparable failure rates drawn from other published sources 
where available (mainly W ASH1400, IEEE 599, RKS 85-25 and 
American nuclear power station data.) Introductory sections define 
the scope of the data book and discuss the choice of components, 
boundaries and statistical methods used, and an appendix indicates 
how the data could be applied to other industries . 
Type of data: Mainly pooled data from similar designs of power stations. Only 
critical failures have been selected, i.e. complete loss of function of 
the component. Voluntary shut-down of a component to avoid 
severe degredation is not necessarily considered to be a critical 
failure. Expert judgment has been used to components with sparse 
data. 
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Data Source: 7 ENI 
Full Name: ENI Reliability Data Bank- Component Reliability 
Handbook, by G. Galvanin, V. Colonibari, and C. Bello 
Published by: Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: October 1982 
Type of components: Valves, pumps, motors, generators, turbines, transformers, 
switch-gear, relays, controllers, switches, thermocouples, 
transmitters, detectors, annunciators� cables, compressors, 
bursting disks, etc. 
No. of component 'types: 30 
Type of information: Handbook summarizing the contents of the ENI Data Bank 
and giving component and equipment failure rates in 
convenient form. 
Source of data: Statistical processing of even reports from various sites within 
ENI Group during the periods 1978-1982. Since ENI is the 
national industry responsible for hydrocarbon development 
within Italy, it is likely that much of the data originates from 
offshore installations and petrochemical process facilities . 
The total sample size was about 6000 items. 
Type of data: All failure rates are expressed as failures per year; there are no 
failure on demand rates . Sample sizes, numbers of events, 
and operational experience in years are provided. Failure 
modes are expressed as occurrence rates for events 
categorized as major failures (loss of function), minor failures 
(reduced performance) or leakage . Mean times to restore to 
service are provided, expressed in hours. 
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Data Source: 8 Greene and Bourne I 
Full Name: AE. Green and AJ. Bourne Reliability Technology 
Published by: Wiley-Interscience 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: 1972 
Type of components: The tables cover mainly electronic components with some 
mechanical components 
Type of information: The book outlines the theory and application of reliability 
technology to the evaluation and validation of the reliability 
of industrial systems. A range of reliability data is presented 
in tabular form in appendix A 
Source of data: The data has no referenced source. 
Type of data: Table A 7 lists average failure rates (f710°) for electronic and 
mechanical components. Table A.8 provides stress level 
factors for use in parts count analyses for the overall 
environment, rating and temperature. 
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Data Source: 9 IAEA-TECDOC 
Full Name: International Atomic Energy Agency 
Published by: International Atomic Energy Agency 
Type of Source: Database 
Date of publication: 1989 
Type of components: Mechanical components, electrical components, 
instrumentation and control, (I&C) equipment and emergency 
power sources. 
No. of component types: 430 
Type of information: Failure rates and probabilities for modes of failure and 
environments 
Source of data: The IAEA Data Base V-ersion 1.0 consists of about 1000 
records compiled from 21 different data sources and include · 
all data from nuclear power plant components usually 
modeled in PSAs (probabilistic safety assessment). 
Type of data: The IAEA Data Base contains about 1000 records. More than 
430 different components are addressed, having an average 
2.2 failure modes. 
Note: The database will run on IBM compatible personal computers. 
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Data Source: 10 IEEE 500 
Full Name: IEEE Guide to the collection and presentation of electrical, 
electronic, sensing component and mechanical equipment 
Reliability data/or Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Std 
500-1984 
Published by: The Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: 1983 
Type of components: A wide range of mechanical and electro-meqhanical 
components plus instrumentation and some light electrical 
components. Components are divided according to function 
into seventeen chapters, each with a hierarchical structure. 
There is no alphabetical index of components. 
No. of component types: Approximately 1200 
Type of information: Data is presented in the form of a hardback standard 
comprising 1424 pages. Each component is presented on a 
standards format Which locates it in its hierarchy and fives, 
where available, failures per 106 hours, failures per 10  cycles 
and out of service time ( or repair and restoration time). If 
several sources are combined on one data sheet, the highest 
and lowest values are also given. Rates are given for different 
failure modes where possible and a reference to the source of 
data is given. Composite component data sheets are created 
by combining data from lower down the hierarchical 
structure, where meaningful. 
Source of data: Data relates mainly to American nuclear power station 
experience but some American general industrial and military 
sources. A structured expert judgment method had been used 
to fill gaps in the collected data. 
Type of data: Some specific, some pooled. Size and application information 
is given for some components. Little environmental 
information is given but tables of environmental factor 





Type of Source: 
Date of publication: 
Type of components: 
Type of information: 
Source of data: 
Type of data: 
1 1  LEES 
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, F .P. Lees 
Buttersworth, London 
Book (2 Volumes) 
1980 
The appendices in Volume 2 contain a wide range of data on 
process plant components,- mechanical and ele_ctrical items; 
and a failure and event database used in the 1978 HSE 
Canvey study. Volume 1 contains a human error database and 
reference is made to common cause failures. 
The books give detailed models and methodologies for 
extensive application ofloss prevention and risk analysis. A 
wide range of reliability data is g�ven including an extensive 
reference list. 
The main sources of reliability data are UKAEA, USAEC and 
Green and Bourne (q.v.), however, many other sources are 
used including the autho_r' s own work which is listed in the 
references. Lees et al. , then Lees published a series of journal 
articles in the early 1970s on the reliability and failure modes 
of instruments in the chemical plant environment. These were 
followed by a more extensive article which also included 
maintenance man-hours and a paper adding nuclear data was 
presented at the IchemE. Symposium 47. 
Data is presented in a series of tables according to generic 
type with the source reference. Failure rates, in some cases 
broken down into failure modes, event rates, human error 
pr�babilities and outage data are given. 




Type of Source: 
Date of publication: 
Type of components: 
No. of comp<ment types: 
Type of information: 
Source of data: 
. 
. 
. Type of data: 
Note: 
12 MIL-HDBK-217F 
Military Handbook -Reliability Prediction of Electronic 
Equipment - Issue F 
US Department of Defense 
Report 
December 1991  
The reference pertains principally to electronic/electrical 
small devices, e.g., semiconductors, wave tubes, resistors, 
capacitors, inductors, relays, switches, connectors, meters, 
lamps, filters, fuses. However, it also contains data for some 
electromechanical rotating devices, e.g., motors. 
19 but man� sub-classes 
The handbook contains two methods of reliability prediction -
Parts Stress Analysis and Parts Count Analysis. The former 
method is of interest from a data source point of view (see 
type of data section below). The latter is used mainly in the 
conceptual design phase 
The source of data is unspecified, although the report states 
'the failure rates and their associated adjustment factors 
presented herein are based upon evaluation and analysis of the 
best available data at the time of issue' . 
Each device is assigned a base failure rate, expressed in 
failures per million hours, which is then multiplied by a series 
of environmental factors chosen according to the 
manufacturing method, quality level and duty, to give a 
corrected rate for the selected application. There are no 
failure on demand rates. 
Although this document is now in the public domain, it was 
initially produced for military use. Many software packages 
are available to carry out prediction to MIL HDBK 217. 
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Data Source: 13 NPRD-91 
Available from: Reliability Analysis Center, PO Box 4700, Rome, New York, 
13441-8200 
Type of Source: Report and database 
Date of publication: 1991  
Type of components: General engineering components approximately 5 0 per cent 
are mechanical including hydraulic and pneumatic 
components. The remainder are divided between electro-
mechanical, instrumentation and light electrical components. 
No. of component types: 1400 
Type of information: The data has been collected by the Reliability Analysis Center 
as an unclassified report. Data for each component type is 
separated, where possible into different operating 
environments. For each entry, the number of data sets is 
given, with the number of failures and operating hours. From 
these are derived point failure rate estimates together with 80 
per cent upper level and 20 per cent lower level values if 
failures occurred and 60 per cent upper levels if no failures 
occurred. Corresponding MTBF s are printed in a separate 
table. Another section of the report tables failures mode 
distributions for the component types. Some of the 
information is presented graphically. The data is also 
available on a PC-accessible floppy disk. 
Source of data: The course of the reliability data is n_ot specified in detail, but 
is predominantly from American military sources with 
substantial input from commerciaVindustrial sources. Sources 
are labeled M(military) of C(commercial) 
Type of data: Data is generic and pooled where appropriate. No 
information is given about size or application although the 
environment is stated. 
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Data Source: 14 OREDA 84 
Full Name: Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (1st Edition) 
Published by: Penn Well Publishing Company on behalf of the OREDA 
participating companies 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: 1984 
Type of components: Covers only equipment used in the offshore oil and gas 
industry and includes safety systems, e.g. ,  firefighting and 
ESD systems, process equipment, e.g., pumps, compressors, 
valves, power generation, drilling, and lifting equipment. 
No. of component types: Around 170 different offshore components are covered 
Type of information: It has the advantage that environmental factors normally 
associated with the relatively severe operating conditions do 
not need to be considered. 
Source of data: The data was collected from a group of eight participating 
companies operating installations in the North Sea and the 
Adriatic Sea during the period 1983- 1 984. 
Type of data: Data is presented in tabular form grouped by taxonomy, 
giving the total population of items and the number of 
different data sources (samples) for each component type. 
Calendar and operationat· times are provided and also the 
numbers of demands for non-rotating mechanisms such as . ' 
valves. Failure modes are categorized as critical (total loss of 
function), degraded (partial loss of function), incipient 
( function not immediately lost but likely future impairment of 
performance), or unknown. The numbers of recorded failures 
under each category are given. Failure rates are expressed in 
failures per million hours; lower and upper bounds as well as 
mean rates are listed where available. In some cases repair 
data is provided in terms of active repair time and repair man-
hours. System boundary diagrams are listed for each 
component. 
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Data Source: 15 OREDA 92 
Full Name: Offshore Reliability Data Handbook (2nd edition) 
Published by: The Oreda participants and distributed by DnV Technica. 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publicf:!tion: 1992 
Type of components: Covers equipment used in the offshore oil and gas industry 
and includes; process systems, safety systems, electrical 
equipment, utility systems, crane systems and drilling 
equipment. 
Type of information: For each item covered, the quantitative generic information 
consists of: Failure modes, failures rates for each failure 
mode, repair, e.g., active repair time given in man hours, 
supportive information. Qualitative information is also 
included covering; item descriptions, off shore applications, 
environmental and operational conditions, failure causes and 
additional descriptions of failure modes, data sources and item 
boundary specifications. 
Source of data: The data was collected from a group of ten participating 
companies operating installations in the North Sea between 
1983 and 1992. 
Type of data: Data is presented in tabular form grouped by taxonomy, 
giving the total population of items and the number of 
different data sources (samples) for each component type. 
Format is similar to OREDA 84. 
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Data Source: 16 RKS/SKI 85-25 
Full Name: Reliability data book for components in Swedish nuclear 
power plants. 
Published by: RKS-Nuclear Safety Board of the Swedish Utilities, SKI-
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate. 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: 1987 
Type of compo�ents: Pumps, valves, instruments, and electrical power equipment 
such as circuit �reakers, transformers, standby generators. 
No. of component 'types: 54 
Type of information: Data is reported in English in the form of a paperback book 
and comprises 145 pages. One table is given to each 
component type. It contains a table of failure rates for·one or 
more failure modes and average repair times for each of eight 
nuclear reactors. Background information in each table 
includes the number of components, demands, and failures in 
the sample. Most tables include a schematic diagram of the 
component and its related services and control equipment to 
define the component boundaries. Introductory chapters 
define the scope of the data book and discuss the choice of 
components, boundaries, and statistical methods. 
Source of data: Data collected at four Swedish nuclear power stations up to 3 1  
December 1 982. 
Type of data: Some data is specific and some is pooled. Where data is 
specific, size information is given. No environmental 
information is given since all components are located in 
power stations. Applications are not usually stated on the 
tables, but a table is given all of the power station systems 
from which data was drawn. 
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Data Source: 17 Rothbart 
Full Name: H.A Rothbart, Mechanical Design and Systems Handbook. 
Published by: McGraw-Hill 
Type of Source: Book 
Date of publication: 1964 
Type of components: Mainly general engineering, but includes approximately 20 
per cent electronic and light electrical · 
No. of component types: 214 
Type of information: Information is tabulated in 1 O pages in the book. A table of 
mean failure rates plus upper and lower extreme values. An 
additional table of generic life-expectancy distributions is 
given for a similar number of items from a different source. 
Mean life expectancy is a measure of life (in hours or cycles) 
at which the wear out phase begins. Tables of severity factors 
are given for each table to take account for different operating 
conditions. 
Source of data: Data sources were not stated. However, they will probably 
originate from American industry and may include some 
aerospace data. 
Type of data: Data is generic. There is some subdivision into different 





Type of Source: 
Date of publication: 
Type of components: 
Type of information: 
Source of data: 
Type of data: 
18 Smith 





The data tables include electronic components, sensors and 
mechanical components. 
This book describes the reliability techniques to achieve 
reliability and maintainability targets. It also covers the 
meas,urement and prediction of reliability together with 
various management topics. The third edition also includes a 
chapter, chapter 22, which lists some of the common 
reliability data sources and provides a useful list of failure 
rates for engineering and microelectronic components 








General Failure Rates 
Microelectronic failure rates 
Fatality rates 
Human error rate 
Percentage failure modes 
The majority of the failure rates in Table I are quoted as 
ranges rather than point estimates of failure rate. 
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Data Source: 20 Wash 1400 
Full Name: Reactor Safety Study. An Assessment of Accident Risks in US 
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants. 
Type of Source: Multi-volume report. Reliability data mainly confined to 
Appendix III - Failure Data. Available on microfiche. 
Date of publication: 1974 
Type of components: General mechanical and electrical, e.g. , pumps, valves, pipes 
and fittings, diesels, battery power supplies, instrumentation, 
clutches, motors, relays, switches and circuit breakers, fuses 
and wires, transformers, solid state devices. 
No. of component types: 30 
Type of information: Tables of mean failure rate/I 06 hours or failures per demand 
for principal failure modes, with upper and lower bounds and 
comparison of nuclear and industrial data. Limited common 
mode failure data. 
Source of data: Data collected in 17 American nuclear power plants during 
1972 is compared with data from 29 published sources from, 
e.g., American industry, NASA, and Air Force data. 
Type of data: Generic. Only valves and switched are separated into 
different types. 
Note: The data and associated material assembled in the report 
incorporate ranges of error bands. These have sufficient 
accuracy, detail, and resolution to satisfy the original 
requirements of the study. However, the data may not be 
sufficiently detailed, general, or accurate enough for use in 
other quantitative reliability models or in applications 
involving greater specificity. 
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Data Source: 21  RMC Harris 
Full Name: Hazards and Reliability Information System 
Published by: RM Consultants Ltd, Abingdon, England, OX14 lDY, 023? 
555155 
Type of Source: Database, data sheets 
Date of publication: 1992 
Type of components: Mechanical, electrical, rotating machinery, instrumentation, 
process, safety, offshore oil and gas, nuclear, petrochemical. 
No. of component types: · 600+ component types, 1700+ reliability data entries. 
Type of information: Data sheet presented on screen, basic failure statistics plus 
additional information on operating environment. Also 
maintainability and hazardous incident databases available. 
Source of data: Data from public domain sources and field failure studies. 
Type of data: Mean failure rate, operating experience, total number of 





Type· of Source: 
22 SRD Data Centre 
SRD Data Centre consists of a Technical Information Data 
Library and a Computerised Databank 
Access via Data Products Manager or SRD Association 
Manager 
Technical Data Library: books, reports, conference papers, 
etc. 
Computerised Databank: field collected event data. 
Date of publication: Ongoing data availability 
Type of components: Over 3 00 component classifications across general industry, 
i.e., process, petrochemical, transport, defence, electricity 
supply, water, manufacturing, computing, etc. 
No. of component 'types: Over 200 component classifications from Actuators to 
Windscreen wipers 
Type of information: . Technical Information Library: public domain literature and 
reports. 
Source of data: 
Type of data: 
Databank: field collected event data processed into 
component populations. 
Field collected event data obtained as a result of collaborative 
data collection campaigns with customer organisations. 
Component Reliability Data: operational and calendar failure 1 
rates, failure modes and causes, environmental factors, 
operating regime, maintenance and testing regime, even 
history information, availability, etc. 
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Appendix A.3 
MATLAB Code Used in Analysis 
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% MATLAB Code for the First Phase 
mttf= [ 3 4 000  2 4 000  1 8 000  
36000  19000  12 000  0 
32000  21000  1 4 0 0 0  0 
3 4500  2 7 0 0 0  17500  0 
i=l ;  





0 0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 ] ; 
mttf ( i , 4 ) = ( 1/ 6 ) * (mttf ( i , 1 ) +4 *mttf ( i , 2 ) +mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ;  
mttf ( i , 5 ) = (mttf ( i , 4 ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) * ( 2 *mttf ( i , 2 ) -mttf ( i , l ) ­
mttf ( i , 3 ) ) / ( (mttf ( i , 2 ) -mttf ( i , 4 ) ) * (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ) ;  
mttf ( i , 6 ) =mttf ( i , 5 ) * (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf (i , 4 ) ) / (mttf ( i , 4 ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) ;  
mttf ( i , 7 ) =beta (mttf ( i , 5 ) , mttf ( i , 6 ) ) ;  
mttf ( i , 8 ) = ( (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) / 3 . 2 ) A2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
fid=fopen ( ' BETAONE ' ) ;  
mult= [ l  13/12 1 l ] ; 
countOneLow=0 ;  
j =l ;  
while j <l00l  
i=l ;  
while i < 5 
BETAONE ; 
MTTF ( i , 2 ) =mttf (i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;  
MTTF ( i , 3 ) =exp ( - 1000/ (mult ( i ) *MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ) ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
laml=l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ; 
lam2=1/MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp (-
1000/ ( ( lamlA 2+lam2 A2+laml*lam2 ) / (lamlA2*lam2+laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;  
Rsys ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ; 
i f  Rsys ( j ) <0 . 915 
countOneLow=countOneLow+l ; 
end 
j =j +l ;  
end 
laml=l/mttf ( 3 , 4 ) ; 
lam2=1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ; 
Rthree=exp (-
1000/ ( ( lamlA2+lam2 A 2+laml*lam2 ) / (lamlA2* lam2+laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;  
RmeanOne=exp (- 100 0/mttf ( l , 4 ) ) *exp ( -1000/mttf ( 2 , 4 ) ) *Rthree;  
probOneLow=countOneLow/ ( j - 1 ) ; 
fprintf ( ' \nProbability too low % 1 . 4 f\n ' , probOneLow) 
fprintf ( ' \n Variances %7 . 2 f %7 . 2f %7 . 2 f %7 . 2 f  
\n ' , mttf ( l , 8 ) /max (mttf ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 2 , 8 ) /max (mttf ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 3 , 8 ) /ma 
x (mtt f ( : , 8 ) ) , mttf ( 4 , 8 ) /max (mttf ( : , 8 ) ) )  
varblurb=mttf ( : , 8 ) ;  
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% MATLAB Code for the Second Phase,  First Attempt 
mttf2= [ 35 35000  0 
5 0  2 6500  0 
17 2 9560  0 
1 8  2 9 8 0 0  0 
150  3 1500  0 
60  2 6000  0 
4 0  2 67 0 0  0 ] ; 
mttf1= [ 15 2 6 178 9 8 0  
2 5  27 0 0 0  2500  
150  31000  12 00  
2 9 8  32000  1500  ] ;  
sum2=sum (mttf2 ( : , 1 ) ) ;  
i=l ;  
mean2=0 ;  
while i < 8 
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 ( i , 2 ) +mean2 ; 
i=i+l ;  
end 
mean2=mean2/sum2 ; 
surnmer=0 ;  
var2 1=0 ; 
i=l ; 
while i < 8 
summer=mttf2 ( i , l ) +surnmer; 
mttf2 (i , l ) =surnmer; 
var2 1=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mttf2 ( i , 2 ) ) A2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
var2 form= (var21/ ( swn2 A2 ) ) A 0 . 5 ; 
sum2=sum (mttfl ( : , 1 ) ) ;  
i=l ; 
meanl=0 ;  
while i < 5 




mttfl ( : , l ) =mttfl ( : , l ) / sum2 ; 
surnmer=0 ;  
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i=l ; 
while i < 5 
sumrner=mttfl ( i , l ) +summer ; 
mttfl ( i , l ) =summer ; 
i=i+l ;  
end 
countTwoLow=0 ;  




while j < 1 0 0 1  
i=3 ; 
BETAONE;  
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;  
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -100 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;  
i=:=4 ; 
BETAONE; 
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;  
MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+1A 2/2 ) ) �var2 form; 
MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/ ( 13*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;  
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A2 ;  
% fprintf ( ' %7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) ) 
i=4 ; 
source ( 2 ) =4 ;  
while i < 5 
x2 l=rand; 
if x2 l<mttfl ( i , l )  
source ( 2 ) =i ;  
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) ­
exp ( 0+1A2 /2 ) ) *mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 3 ) ; 
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( -100 0/MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;  
end 
varl=varl+ (MTTF ( l , 2 ) -meanl ) A2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
laml=l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ; 
lam2=1/MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp (-
1 0 0 0/ ( ( lamlA2 +lam2 A2+laml*lam2 ) / ( lamlA2*lam2 +laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;  
RsysTwo ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ; 
if  RsysTwo ( j ) <0 . 9 15 
countTwoLow=countTwoLow+l ;  
end 
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j =j +l ;  
end 
laml=l/mttf ( 3 , 4 ) ; 
lam2=1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ; 
Rthree=exp (-
10 00/ ( ( laml A2+lam2 A2+laml *lam2 ) / (laml A2*lam2+laml*lam2 A2 ) ) ) ;  
RmeanTwo=exp (-1000/meanl ) * exp (-100 0/mean2 ) *Rthree 
var2=var2/ ( j -2 ) ; 
varl=varl/ ( j -2 ) ; 
var3 l=mttf ( 3 , 8 ) ; 
var32=mttf ( 4 , 8 ) ; 
vars=max ( [ varl var2 varl var32 ] ) ;  
fprintf ( ' \n Vars %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f \n ' , varl , var2 , var31 , var32 ) 
fprintf ( ' Vars %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f 
\n ' , varl/vars , var2 /vars , var31/vars , var32/vars ) 
probTwoLow=countTwoLow/ ( j - 1 )  
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% MATLAB Code for the Second Phas e ,  Second Attempt 
mtt f2= [ 35 35000  0 
50  26500  0 
17 2 9560  0 
1 8  2 98 00 0 
150  31500  0 
60  2 6000  0 
4 0  2 67 0 0  0 ] ; 
mttfl= [ l5 2 6178  9 8 0  
2 5  2 7 0 0 0  2500 . 
150  31000  1200  
2 9 8  32 000  1500  ] ;  
mtt f32= [ 1 00  29500  3 400  
50  30500  9 000 ] ; 
sum2=sum (mttf2 ( : , l ) ) ;  
i=l ; 
mean�=O ;  
while 1 < 8 
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 (1 , 2 ) +mean2 ; 
i=i+l ; 
end 
mean2=mean2/sum2 ;  
summer=O ;  
var2 1=0 ;  
i=l ;  
while i < 8 
summer=mttf2 ( i , l ) +summer;  
mtt f2 ( i , l ) =summer; 
var2 l=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mttf2 ( i , 2 ) ) �2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
var2 form= (var21/ ( sum2 �2 ) ) � 0 . 5 ; 
sum2=sum (mttfl ( : , l ) ) ;  
i=l ;  
meanl=O ;  
while i < 5 




mtt fl ( : , l ) =mttfl ( : , l ) / sum2 ; 
summer=O ;  
i=l ;  
while i < 5 
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summer=mttfl ( i , l ) +summer;  
mttfl ( i , l ) =summer;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
sum2=sum (mttf32 ( : , 1 ) ) ;  
i=l ;  
mean32=0 ;  
while i < 3 
mean32=mttf32 ( i , l ) *mttf32 ( i , 2 ) +mean32 ; 
i=i+l ; 
end 
mean32=mean32/sum2 ;  
mttf32 ( : , l ) =mttf32 ( : , 1 ) /sum2 ; 
summer=0 ;  
i=l ; 
while i < 3 
summer=mttf32 (·i , 1 )  +summer;  




j =l ;  
var2=0 ;  
varl=0 ;  
var32=0 ;  
while j < 1 0 0 1  
i=4 ;  
BETAONE ;  
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , il ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ;  
MTTF ( 4 , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 0 0 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;  
MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+1A2/2 ) ) *var2 form; 
MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0 / ( 13 *MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;  
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A2 ;  
% fprintf ( ' % 7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) ) 
i=4 ;  
s ource ( 2 ) =4 ;  
while i < 5 
x2 1=rand; , 
if x2 1<mttfl ( i , 1 )  
source ( 2 ) =i ;  
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) ­
exp ( 0+1A 2/2 ) ) *mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 3 ) ; 
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp (-1000/MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;  
end 




i=l ; . 
source ( 3 ) =2 ;  
while i < 3 
x32=rand; 
i f  x32<mttf32 ( i )  
source ( 3 ) =i ;  
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf32 ( source ( 3 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) ­
exp ( 0+1A2 /2 ) ) *mttf32 ( source ( 3 ) , 3 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 0 0 0/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ) ;  
end 
var32=var32 + (MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) -mean32 ) A 2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
laml=l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ; 
lam2=1 /MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -
1000/ ( ( laml A2+lam2A 2+laml *lam2 ) / ( lamlA2 *lam2+laml*lam2A 2 ) ) ) ;  
Rs ysTwo ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ; 
if RsysTwo ( j ) < 0 . 915  
countTwoLow=countTwoLow+l ;  
end 
j =j +l ;  
end 
laml=l/mttf ( 3 , 4 ) ; 
lam2=1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ; 
Rthree=exp ( -
1000/  ( ( laml A2+lam2A 2+1aml* lam2 ) / ( laml A2 *lam2+1aml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;  
RmeanTwo=exp ( -1000/meanl ) *exp ( � l000/mean2 ) * Rthree 
var2=var2/ ( j -2 ) ; 
varl=varl/ ( j -2 ) ; 
var3l=mttf ( 3 , 8 ) ; 
var32=var32/ ( j -2 ) ; 
vars=max ( [varl var2 var31 var32 ] ) ;  
fprintf ( ' \n Vars %7 . 3 f % 7 . 3f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f \n ' , varl , var2 , var3 1 , var32 ) 
fprintf ( ' Vars % 7 . 3f %7 . 3 f % 7 . 3f %7 . 3f 
\n ' , varl/vars , var2/vars , var31/vars , var32/vars ) 
probTwoLow=countTwoLow/ ( j -1 )  
varblurb= [varl var2 var3 1 var32 ] ;  
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% MATLAB Code for the Third Phase 
mttf2= [ 35 35000  0 
5 0  · 2 6500  0 
17  2 9 560  0 
1 8  2 9 8 0 0  0 
150  31500  0 
60 2 6000  0 
4 0  2 67 0 0  0 ] ; 
mttfl= [ l5 2 617 8 9 8 0  
25  2 7 0 0 0  2 5 0 0  
150  3 1 0 0 0  12 00  
2 9 8  32 000  1500  ] ;  
mttf32= [ 1 00  29500  700  
5 0  3 0500  9 00 ] ; 
sum2=sum (m�tf2 ( : , l ) ) ;  
i=l ;  
mean2=0 ; 
while i < 8 
mean2=mttf2 ( i , l ) *mttf2 ( i , 2 ) +mean2 ; 
i=i+l ; 
end 
mean2=mean2 /sum2 ; 
summer=0 ;  
var2 1=0 ; 
i=l ;  
while i < 8 
summer=mtt f2 ( i , l ) +summer ; 
mttf2 ( i , l ) =summer; 
var2 l=mttf2 ( i , l ) * (mttf2 (i , 2 ) ) "2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
var2 form= (var21/ ( sum2"2 ) ) " 0 . 5 ; 
sum2=sum (mttf32 ( : , l ) ) ;  
i=l ;  
mean32=0 ; 
while i < 3 








while i < 3 
summer=mttf32 ( i , l ) +summer ; 
mttf32 ( i , l ) =summer;  
i=i+l ;  
end 
countTwoLow=0 ;  




while j < 1 0 0 1  
i=4 ; 
BETAONE ; 
MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) =mttf ( i , 3 ) + (mttf ( i , l ) -mttf ( i , 3 ) ) *X ; 
MTTF ( 4 , 3 ) =exp ( -1 00 0/MTTF ( i , 2 ) ) ;  
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =3227 1 . 7 6+ ( exp ( randn) -exp ( 0+1 A2/2 ) ) * 2564 . 66 ;  
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( -1 000/ ( 13*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;  
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -32272 ) A2 ;  
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mean2+ ( exp ( randn ) -exp ( 0+1A2 / 2 ) ) *var2 form; 
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( - 1 000/ ( 1 3*MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) / 12 ) ) ;  
var2=var2+ (MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) -mean2 ) A2 ;  
% fprintf ( ' % 7 . 2 f\n ' , MTTF ( 2 , 2 ) ) 
i=4 ; 
source ( 2 ) =4 ;  
while i < 5 
end 
x2 1=rand; 
if  x2 1<mttfl ( i , 1 )  
source ( 2 ) =i ;  
MTTF ( l , 2 ) =mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) ­
exp ( 0+1A2/2 ) ) *mttfl ( source ( 2 ) , 3 ) ;  
MTTF ( l , 3 ) =exp ( -1000/MTTF ( l , 2 ) ) ;  
end 
varl=varl+ (MTTF ( l , 2 ) -meanl ) A2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
i=l ; 
source ( 3 ) =2 ;  
while i < 3 
x32=rand; 
i f  x32<mttf32 ( i )  
source ( 3 ) =i ;  
MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) =mttf32 ( source ( 3 ) , 2 ) + ( exp ( randn ) ­
exp ( 0+1 A2/2 ) ) *mttf32 ( source ( 3 ) , 3 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -100 0/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ) ;  
end 
93 
var32=var32+ (MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) -mean32 ) A2 ;  
i=i+l ; 
end 
laml=l/MTTF ( 3 , 2 ) ; 
lam2=1/MTTF ( 4 , 2 ) ; 
MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) =exp ( -
1 0 0 0/ ( ( lamlA2+lam2A 2+laml*lam2 ) / ( lamlA2*lam2+laml*lam2 A 2 ) ) ) ;  
Rs ysTwo ( j ) =MTTF ( l , 3 ) *MTTF ( 2 , 3 ) *MTTF ( 3 , 3 ) ; 
if  RsysTwo ( j ) <0 . 9 15  
countThreeLow=countThreeLow+l ; 
end 
% fprintf ( ' % 7 . 3 f %7 . 3f %7 . 3 f 
% 1 . 4 f\n ' , MTTF ( l , 3 )  , MTTF ( 2 , 3 )  , MTTF ( 3 , 3 )  ,· RsysTwo ( j ) ) 
j =j +l ;  
end 
laml=l/mttf ( 3 , 4 ) ; 
lam2=1/mttf ( 4 , 4 ) ; 
Rthree=exp ( -
1000/ ( ( lamlA2+lam2A2+laml*lam2 ) / (lamlA2 *lam2+laml*lam2 A2 ) ) ) ;  
:RmeanThree=exp ( -100 0/32272 ) *exp ( -100 0/mean2 ) *Rthree 
var2=var2/ ( j -2 ) ; 
varl=varl/ ( j -2 ) ; 
var31=mttf (3 , B ) ; . 
var32=var32/ ( j -2 ) ; 
vars=max ( [varl var2 var31 var32 ] ) ;  
fprintf ( ' \n Vars %7 . 3f  %7 . 3f  %7  . . 3f  %7 . 3f  \n ' ,  varl ,  var2 , var31 ,  var32 ) 
fprintf ( ' Vars %7 . 3f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f %7 . 3 f 
\n ' , varl/vars , var2/vars , var3 1/vars , var32/vars ) 
probThreeLow=countThreeLow/ ( j -1 )  
varblurb= [varl var2 var31 var32 ] ; 
94 
% MATLAB Code for generation of  Beta distribution 
% Developed using algorithm provided by Fishman [ 9 ]  
dl=min (mttf ( i , 5 ) , mttf ( i , 6 ) ) ;  
d2=max (mttf ( i , 5 ) , mttf ( i , 6 ) ) ;  
d3=dl+d2 ; 
d4= ( ( d3-2 ) / ( 2 *dl*d2-d3 ) ) A Q . 5 ; 
d5=dl+l/d4 ; 
accept=O ; 
while  accept <l 
Ul=rand; 
U2=rand; 
V=d4*log ( (Ul/ ( l-Ul ) ) ) ;  
W=exp (V) ; 
Z l=Ul*Ul*U2 ; 
R=d5*V-log ( 4 ) ; 
S=dl+R-W; 
T=log ( Z l ) ; 
i f  S+l+log { S ) >=S*Zl  
accept=l ; 
elsei f S>=T 
accept=l ;  
erid 
end 
i f  dl>mttf ( i , 5 )  
X=W/ (d2+W) ; 
else 
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